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THE RISK OF RE-COLONIZATION AS THE POSTCOLONIAL TASK CONTINUES
Dr. Gregory Selber
The University of Texas-Pan American, USA
Like all post-colonial countries, modern India is an ontological minefield where
identity at several levels is being contested on battlefields ranging from history
to education to popular culture. As a former colony, it has a special burden in
terms of deciding what it is and is not, as the legacy of domination continues
somewhat to drive the ongoing construction process in various ways.
Peter Ron De Souza (2000) particularizes the question confronting all states in
these dynamic times, and one more germane for post-colonial ones: Which
India? Whose India? And who has the power to make fundamental ontological
and epistemological decisions on behalf of the worldâ€™s second most
populous country?
The search for an identity is made more complex because there are four ID
levels to consider (individual, group, national and global), with twin dimensions
to each. For each level, factor in the internal dimension (how the person,
group or nation imagines itself, or self-image) and the external (its reputation
and image assessed from the outside, or what the world thinks), and it is
apparent that the task of meaning-making is a continuous, negotiated and
controversial one that remains an incomplete project at best. But one cannot
speak of a single, monolithic identity, rather a murky combination whose
components come variously to the fore in certain situations, receding in favor
of others at different junctures.
Given the multiplicity and contingency inherent in a term such as identity, how
does a post-colonial state control its own destiny? De Souza suggests that the
goal for such a state should be to see itself - and be seen as well - as a state,
and not an ex-colony any longer. But post-colonial theory and literature reflect
the slow, arduous process in attaining such autonomy. New states - and
following historical modernization standards, India can still be considered in
this category despite its laudable performance since independence in 1947 remain in thrall to their former masters in subtle ways, no longer under direct
physical dominance but having been formed and defined against their will by
the powers that were (Robb 2007). Still beholden to the inheritance of their
former masters in some respects, such post-colonials are taking part in
modern subject formation on all levels and dimensions as hybrids,
combinations of their pre-colonial selves, the residual legacy of domination,
and dialectically, the new identities that are made.
The key in identity construction for newly independent states is the intervening
institutions that have historically mediated the process for all national entities:

history and memory, education and knowledge, power and politics, economics,
and media and communication, among others.
Negotiating the contested contours of what these mediating institutions create
and destroy, and understanding the formation process as it intersects with
such elements as class, gender, and race/religion, are the equations set up for
post-colonial states to solve.
In the particular case of India, this means taking the external identity
conceptions of the state elaborated from the outside, and melding their
agreeable aspects with an inclusive, internal identity on multiple levels. The
stateâ€™s tradition of syncretism, much debated in the past several decades
and decried by many as not only false but consistently harmful to subaltern,
indigenous Indian sub-cultures, is at the crux of the matter (Bharucha Rustom
2000). Is the idea of tolerance long trumpeted as the Indian mantra truly
extant? If so, how has it treated with alternative populations lacking autonomy
and epistemological power? Can such a syncretism be reasonably expected to
exist in any real measure in any state, much less a post-colonial one? Or have
modern Indian elites re-colonized the stateâ€™s marginalized groups as they
dominate the decision-making regarding cultural concerns, historical
knowledge, and discourse vis a vis the nationâ€™s global and national
intercourse?
How can modern India integrate all sub-cultures into the process of
construction of identities as much as possible, and make strides toward
outdistancing the colonial legacies that still define it? And finally, what is the
role of mass media/communication to these ends?
POWER, KNOWLEDGE, AND SUBJUGATION
Historical memory, as a guide to the past and a road to the future, has always
been at the forefront in identity construction, as originally outlined by Maurice
Halbwachs in the 1920s (Lewis Coser, 1992). How a state sees its
development and achievements leads to the erection of a collective
consciousness inculcated through the mediating institution of education, as
young people are instructed and socialized based on conceptions of the
stateâ€™s founding mythology, traditions, and rituals. Historical memory here
then acts as the impetus and material for teaching Indians who they were and
are, but it is also a situation tied intimately to notions of power.
According to Michel Foucault (1978), historical remembering is associated with
the modality of power automatically, as those in charge of a stateâ€™s
institutions are granted the naming power and sorting mechanism that
adjudicate the important ontological and epistemological questions. In
Indiaâ€™s case, during its 200-plus years of colonization by the British, there
were periodic attempts made by the colonizers to assess its history, and thus
identity. Romila Tharad (2000) argues that such an historical exercise on the
part of the powerful implied an ahistorical assumption in regard to India itself.
In seeking to define their possession, British historians considered the
thousands years of Indian existence prior to the onset of colonization to be
part of the so-called dark period, before Enlightenment civilization came to the

region. Even more nettlesome for those who struggled against such enforced
reductionism, Tharad notes that the process of â€œdiscoveringâ€
Indian
history often asserted itself as well in the service of legitimizing colonization,
and of strengthening administrative control over helpless, culture-less peoples
who â€œneeded to be shown the light.â€
Here is a classic example of what Antonio Gramsci (1971) referred to as the
interplay between ruler and ruled. While its masters sought to define India, the
people turned to their own history, lacking true autonomy but salving the
wounds of domination by use of symbolic power through retention and
remembrance of personal narratives.
Still, while some of this internal autonomy did take place in colonial India, pace
Foucault (1978), across the board in colonial situations, the correlation is
nearly absolute between power and the constitution and political application of
knowledge. Thus, while Peter Robb (2007) asserts that Indians chose to reject
some British conceptions of them and accept others, the blunt truth was that
through control of all mediating, socializing institutions, the British defined
India and these definitions to a great degree constructed the identities of the
subjugated peoples, from their style of government down to the lilts in their
language use which persist to this day.
THE POST-COLONIAL RECENT PAST AND PRESENT
While there are certainly vestiges of colonialism remaining in the landscape,
the state has forged its own way for 50 years, and has gone through a number
of transition phases in that period. One such concerned the so-called Transition
Debates of the 1960s and 1970s. How should the post-colonial India handle its
free status, not only in terms of identity but also decisions about more
tangible, pragmatic issues such as economics and industrialization? The
embrace of the phenomenon of globalization, which truly came full circle only
in 1991 with sweeping economic reforms, has had a series of impacts on every
facet of life.
Here it is wise to reference the various sociological theories on modernization
in the attempt to understand the stateâ€™s engagement with post-colonial
status. In 1937, Talcott Parsons published the classic, â€œThe Structure of
Social Action,â€
in which he wrote that individual action is somewhat
circumscribed by mediating institutions which ensure order and equilibrium by
transmitting value systems along with the infrastructures therein. So while
developing societies transition from traditional to modern status, or in the
communal terms of Ferdinand Tonnies, gemeinschaft to gesellschaft, certain
traits are retained, others created, and others lost. Michael Latham (2000)
suggests that while there is a considerable resilience to traditional cultural
forms despite industrialization and urbanization, the attendant losses can
include a lessening of genuine, personal relations leading eventually to a
troubling ethos of atomization-consumption-competition.
With increased output and consumption through industrialization, various
results are engendered for individuals, groups, and the state. Exposure to

modern institutions such as urbanization, literacy, media use, and political
participation situate the state â€œinâ€ the global world and thereby inculcate
citizens with the modernization ideology (Daniel Lerner, 1958). This
worldviewâ€™s implicit assumption is that taking such steps is vital to an
evolutionary trajectory that is seen as unproblematic and natural. Somewhat
like the mindset once in play during colonialism, this ideology suggests that
following the stages of growth outlined by Walt Rostow (1960) will aid the
â€œunderdeveloped peripheryâ€ in joining the world of nations undergoing
gradual transformation toward a â€œbetter life.â€
The intended consequence of this process is to enable the new state to
compete in the world market economy and improve the standard of living for
its people, augmenting production and consumption alike. One major
unintended consequence is a growing dependence on economics, which begins
to shape non-economic areas of life such as the maintenance and production of
cultural forms (Arthur Lewis, 1962). Instead of being dependent on colonizing
powers to help drive the train, post-colonial states subscribing to the
modernization ideology become dependent on the world market, including
foreign investment, education, and inadvertently, cultural forms from other
regions.
This re-colonizing by capitalism and its production-consumer logic has been
described in various post-colonial theories authored by Edward Said (1978)
and Gayatri Spivak (1988), among others. Cultural imperialism, or the
imposition of values from without by more powerful producers of content, has
been well documented and argued. The replacement of traditional cultural
creations and forms with those represented in forms from the West is a risk
that modernizing states take. Identity formation, dependent on the repetition
of cultural forms through education, media use, and historical knowledge
construction, is then engineered increasingly by producers from outside the
state, or by elite producers in-state who have the power to construct materials
leading to such identities. This implies that while individuals and group
members can retain some autonomy and authorship - mainly through
perpetration of local cultural forms - their national and global Indian identities
become a hodge-podge of influences from the West and from Indian entities
largely implicated in a cultural imperialism from within, so to speak.
Which India begins to dominate the depictions and cultural forms that illustrate
and define the various identities? Whose India comes to signify India to the
world? In examining the mass media as one of the mediating institutions that
Parsons elucidated, one can illuminate two ideas: the impact of exposure to
the world of cultural and commodified forms, and the outcome of such a
process on disenfranchised, marginal groups in India. The identities of these
powerless groups become largely circumscribed by others; they become recolonized, in part by their fellow Indians and in part by the Westâ€™s idea of
what makes a modern culture.
MEDIA, COMMUNICATION, AND THE POWER IMBALANCE

John Thompson (1995) writes that while classic sociologists have focused on
rationalization and secularization as the key engines to modernization and
social change over time, the media and communication have played a role but
have been understudied to this end. The social organization of symbolic power
through media has been integral to the rise of modern societies; as the
networks of communication expand, their effects are interwoven with other
forms of power. Thompsonâ€™s point is that scholars must not underestimate
the impact that communication has had on the development of modern states
and their self-images.
With modern communication, citizens are bombarded with exposure to foreign
cultures, political worldviews and economic ideologies, e.g. modernization.
Such exposure causes new ideas to proliferate, and contact with the world
stimulates the mechanisms that can effect social change (Latham 2007).
The mass media have been important to the growth of the post-colonial state.
B.G. Verghese (2000) notes that the spread of communication was utilized in
the 1940s by Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, to foment and mobilize
non-violent activity that eventually led to the abatement of British domination.
Just as the media have made their presence count toward the attainment of
freedom, there have also been times in recent national history when control of
communication, such as in the case of Indira Gandhiâ€™s censorship campaign
during The Emergency of 1975-77, have greatly retarded this process.
Clifford Geertz (1973) asserted that people are implicated in webs of
significance as they live their lives, and he adds that these webs are largely of
their own making. But to some theorists, notably the subaltern writers like
Spivak (1988), a vast majority of indigenous peoples are less likely to
participate in the spinning of such webs. So for identity construction on various
levels, these marginal sub-cultures are much more likely to find their selfimages managed by state hegemony or cultural imperialism from without.
Subaltern and indigenous peoples are thus yoked to a new dependence on
their elites, or on the conceptions made by Western cultural producers.
The kisan sabhas, or peasant societies, and dalits, or untouchables, find very
little solidarity because they have no autonomous institutions with which to
accumulate and perpetuate texts or traditions of their choosing. Buffeted by an
economic system that looks outward to the global market, and increasingly
taught by an educational apparatus that has recast many of their understood
notions of Indianness, the powerless remain so, and find that their traditional
ways are falling by the wayside in the process. They are defined by what they
are not and begin to internalize an absence from the cultural discourse, in
effect becoming colonized once again, but by different masters. Instead of
taking their turn at self- and group/national-definition, such marginals are
often limited to a symbolic television voyeurism (Rustom 2000). The imbalance
of culture transmission from active in-state elites and Westerners constructs a
passive internal identity for powerless peoples, substituting modern forms for
traditional ones. The breakdown of the social ecology of the disenfranchised
means their experiences are increasingly empty and symbolic, not lived and

self-generated. In the absence of naming power, the groups in question have
little to fall back on save for dharmashastras, the social and ritual obligations
of caste (Tharad 2000).
Some thinkers, like Thompson, have suggested that the cultural imperialism
model, initiated by Herbert Schiller (1969) and later refined by Said,
underestimates the active nature of the audience. Reassessments of the
imperialism model insist that supposedly powerless cultures actually possess
more potential for agency than has been assumed, but again, it would appear
that this proposed autonomy is made manifest largely in symbolic ways, as
opposed to in real exchanges of power, i.e. the ability to name and define. The
flaw in the conception of an active audience is that it seems to imply that
viewer choice of programming, for example, is as efficacious as political
participation, a notion that is highly problematic at best.
It can be argued that while indigenous citizens have freedom of choice,
including selecting Bollywood films over those from the West, the important
decisions on epistemological matters - such as the character of Indianness,
history and culture portrayed in Indian films - are made by the elites and not
by the common folk.
It is here that the national identity of tolerance, embodied by the Hindutva
slogan of â€œone nation, one language, one culture,â€ begins to seem for the
disaffected like colonialism all over again, under different masters. Many postcolonial writers have described the belief that India is a multicultural state
giving credence and productive capacity to all sub-cultures as pernicious. De
Souza analyzes this lingering and powerful conception of a tolerant India as
oppressive when juxtaposed against the ubiquitous signature of caste. Rustom
adds that the diversities of the state are managed and bordered by state
hegemony that controls exchange and production of various cultural forms. So
while the ideas of diversity and multiculturalism have become part of the
national identity, the fruits of these laudable elements may not be enjoyed on
an equal basis by the powerless.
The use of mass media and communication to maintain the national identity
coalesce with education and historical knowledge accumulation, illustrating
what Parsons characterized in the 1930s: mediating institutions keeping order
and equilibrium by circumscribing value systems through the transmission
process. The degree to which this systematic power is appropriated by elites
and/or gerrymandered by outside sources will vary. But in most cases, recent
history has shown that the scale of domination and its attendant lack of
autonomy and productive capacity by those outside the state power structure
are consistently ironclad.
Still, there have always been sites of resistance and contestation in terms of
the power to construct identities and have a voice in the development and
maintenance of mediating institutions. Stuart Hall (1982) wrote extensively
about the possibility of various readings of cultural texts depending on
oneâ€™s worldview, and his notion of dominant, oppositional or emergent
interpretations of materials in education, history and popular culture are

theoretically emphatic. However, in terms of cultural production or true
epistemological force, Hallâ€™s ideas remain untapped resources to a great
extent. The sub-cultures of a developing state often do not possess experience
in mobilizing for change, are deficient in basic educational ability that might
further facilitate such activism, and spend the majority of their time scratching
out a living in extreme poverty, making the possibility of grass-roots efforts to
effect social change unlikely. Even if such groups were able to overcome these
nearly endemic obstacles, their residence outside the power structure of state
society means that they will have few opportunities to try anything significant.
They are stuck with symbolic choice, which does little to alleviate their plight or
ascribe to them any real power.
Occasionally, subaltern efforts to rearrange the power differential in regard to
cultural valorization, indigenous production and balanced exchange show
progress. The recent â€œWe Are Oneâ€
campaign seeking to infiltrate
communal spaces with billboards and other media stressing racial and religious
diversity have met with some surface success. Countering what Verghese
(2000) calls the â€œsaffronizationâ€ of most religious festivals, such efforts
are designed to carve out a niche for previously marginalized sub-cultures,
giving them an opportunity to create their own cultural forms and identities.
The SITE program of 1976-77, which employed 400 rural villages in a pilot
activity involving direct satellite television programming to integrate traditional
and minority religious forms into mainstream cultural consumption, was
another positive step.
However, it must be noted that such alternative efforts are hamstrung by the
institutional factors previously discussed, and further limited by the continuing
power differential between state elites and Western producers of content on
one hand and the 70 percent of the Indian population that is rural, illiterate, or
poverty-stricken, at times all three, on the other.
CONCLUSION: BACK TO ONTOLOGY, AND THE SYSTEMS DEBATE
In the end, sociological theories like Parsonsâ€™ social action configuration
appear to have an inescapable logic in the real world. Modern societies are
driven by industry, economics, political power and increasingly, mediated
communication. This last, through the universal, internal logic of the market,
dictates that the strong shall survive and prosper, through the propagation of
their ideologies and identity conceptions strengthened through production and
repetition of cultural forms.
For the vast majority of peoples in any state, but especially in developing,
post-colonial ones, the opportunity to engage in identity construction at
anything but an individual, largely symbolic level is drastically limited. These
marginal sub-cultures are thus doomed to a re-colonization by elites in their
midst, and by onrushing hordes of cultural imperialists looking for new markets
for their Westernized products. Many of the cultural forms in question pertain
to the powerless only by fashioning the external identity (what the world thinks
of India) and over time hammering out to a striking degree the marginalized
groupsâ€™ internal self-images.

While there may be sites of resistance, and junctures of contestation, most of
these liminal moments in post-colonial states are dominated by a small
number of elites. Adjusting the institutional apparatuses of administration, i.e.
education, popular culture, and history, to reflect truly inclusive pluralism is a
daunting task, one that so-called â€œfully developedâ€ nations like the United
States are just now beginning to understand and address.
There has been constant disagreement about the supposed organicism of
societies, with some scholars insisting that per Parsons, there is only so much
change that can be expected, and that the historical path of development with its evolutionary trajectory of improvement of mediating institutions represents the only sure way to ensure stability, order, and the possibility of
effective competition in the global economy. Many of these functionalists do
not necessarily harbor either disdain or disregard for the powerless, though
some do. They simply suggest that societal growth and maintenance possess
an inner logic that cannot be deviated from to a large degree without creating
utter chaos and eventually, the deterioration of the state.
Others, from the humanist camp, counter by saying that while there may be
an historically vindicated process of development, such systems are open to
change based on various mitigating factors that point to flaws in the system,
one of the more prominent being inequality. These thinkers suggest that
deterioration of the state might take place on the basis of what the
functionalists warn against. But they add that eventually the state will find
itself crumbling when Gramsciâ€™s emergent masses reach a tipping point of
such frustration with what they see as an exclusive, exploitative system that
they are ready to take up arms in mobilization against the neo-colonizer. The
interplay between evolution and revolution, it appears, could in time yield a
middle ground that will enable more participation in identity construction and
institutional power while maintaining the productive capacity, stability, and
order that modern states require.
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